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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis constitutes the first monograph on British propaganda for Spain during the 
Second World War, as part of the British war effort to diminish Nazi influence in Spain and 
to keep Franco out of the war or to defer his entry as long as possible. From his 
appointment as ‘special’ ambassador to Spain, Sir Samuel Hoare’s personal appeasing 
initiatives quickly escalated into a systematic and well-organised propaganda organisation 
with headquarters at the Madrid embassy. With the help of the embassy staff, Hoare 
managed to establish an important network of contacts that ensured that British propaganda 
material breached Franco’s restrictions and reached Spaniards from all classes and regions. 
As this study argues, the embassy’s propaganda successes were mainly due to the fact that 
the propagandists knew how to adjust British interests to Spanish customs and norms. For 
instance, this thesis will give detailed account on the functioning of some peculiar methods 
of propaganda such as the so-called Religious Propaganda and the Embassy Medical Service. 
Lastly, this study will also analyse the propagandists’ constant exposure to violent 
aggressions at hands of the police and the members of the Falange, as well as their struggle 
to keep British opinion as neutral as possible regarding Spain.  
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‘The British propaganda machine in Madrid is very busy, works in any field and 
everywhere has plenty of money. To Communists is speaks for Communism, to 
Monarchists it is pro-Monarchy, to Liberal business people it behaves as a Liberal and 
is very Christian in its relation with clergymen. The British propaganda centre is just a 
big shop, any kind of ideas can be had, but there is one aim, namely: to dissolve the 
Spanish regime, and to make Spain weak again by introducing again the old parties 
and their rivalries.’  
Völkischer Beobachter (2 November 1943).1 
                                                
1 Cited in Tom F. Burns, ‘British Propaganda in Spain in 1943’ (22 August 1944); XIII:23(41)[c], p. 1. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Throughout World War II, the Francoist Government posed a serious challenge to the 
British Foreign Office, which was doing its utmost to keep Spain out of the war. For Britain, 
it was of crucial importance that Spain did not follow the example of Italy entering the war 
on Hitler’s side. Otherwise, the Allies’ strategic objectives in Northern Africa and the 
Mediterranean would have been seriously harmed. This is the reason why both Nazi 
Germany and Britain put such a great effort in increasing their influence within Spain, each 
of them with very different means. 
On the one hand, as a result of Hitler’s involvement in the Spanish Civil War, the Germans 
had an immense propaganda machine in Spain that had infiltrated every area of Spanish 
everyday life by September 1939. On the other hand, the British Ministry of Information 
had been established as late as 4 September 1939, and, together with the Foreign Office, had 
lesser influence on Franco’s Government. This being so, Britain needed an immediate 
solution if it were to reverse this situation in which the Germans had all the material, logistic 
and moral means to drive Spain into the war. 
In this sense, the appointment of Sir Samuel Hoare as the new British Ambassador to Spain 
in May 1940 was arguably the most pivotal measure taken by His Majesty’s Government. 
Hoare had been assigned a simple but extremely difficult ‘special mission’: keeping Spain 
neutral for as long as possible. Although originally planned for a few months, Hoare’s 
successes at the Embassy in Madrid protracted his mission until the end of the war. During 
his time in Spain the Ambassador developed a strategic plan of his own in which the 
embassy’s propaganda for Spain played a central role. 
Surprisingly, historical scholarship, which has thoroughly studied almost every other aspect 
of the British war effort, has yet to assess the important role British propaganda played in 
  viii 
winning the war.2 In fact, none of the major publications analysing Anglo-Spanish relations 
during this period has even mentioned the existence of British propaganda campaigns in 
Spain.3 A rare exception to this rule is Robert Cole’s enlightening monograph, which 
analyses the Ministry of Information’s propaganda plans for neutral Europe, including 
Spain.4 However, the breadth of Cole’s book, together with the fact that his narrative is 
mainly built upon sources from the Ministry of Information, make his book lose sight of 
how the ministry’s propaganda works in practice. In fact, as I will argue during this thesis, 
the ministry’s propaganda plans for Spain were but a mere glimpse of the whole wartime 
propaganda apparatus that Sir Samuel Hoare was developing in Spain. 
The main aim of this thesis is to provide answers as to why, how and by whom British 
propaganda in Spain was established. Due to length restrictions, I will mainly focus on the 
most singular propaganda methods developed by the British Embassy, explaining how these 
schemes worked in practice, and who were the people, besides ambassador Hoare, that 
developed them. The second aim of this thesis is to provide with an alternative approach to 
Francoist Spain. This approach is based on the Embassy’s propagandists necessity to find 
their way through the cracks of Franco’s regime in order to set up their propaganda. 
Through their experiences, we will gain knowledge about the dissidents, factions, and plots 
that were occurring within Spain, as well as the needs of ordinary Spaniards in those 
turbulent times. 
Due to the already mentioned lack of secondary sources, virtually all of the sources used in 
this thesis are archive material. In particular, I have worked with the Templewood Papers, 
                                                
2 Tim Brooks, British Propaganda to France, 1940-1944: Machinery, Method and Message (Edinburgh, 2007), xviii-xix. 
3 See for example Denis Smyth, Diplomacy and Strategy of Survival: British Policy and Franco’s Spain, 1940-41 
(Cambridge, 1986); Enrique Moradiellos, Franco frente a Churchill: España y Gran Bretaña en la Segunda Guerra 
Mundial, 1938-1945 (Barcelona, 2005); Richard Wigg, Churchill and Spain: the Survival of the Franco Regime, 1940-
1945 (London, 2005); and Emilio Sáenz-Francés San Baldomero, Entre la Antorcha y la Esvástica: Franco en la 
Encrucijada de la Segunda Guerra Mundial (Madrid, 2009). 
4 Robert Cole, Britain and the War of Words in Neutral Europe, 1939-1945 (London, 1990). 
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which contain Sir Samuel Hoare’s personal and official documents from his lifelong career. 
Thus, this work is a result of a systematic study of Part XIII’s 24 files (1225 items) that 
cover Hoare’s ambassadorship in Spain during World War II.  
In methodological terms, and due to fact that I will be dealing with topics not yet known to 
the historical scholarship, I will quite often emphasise the value of certain reports, 
memoranda, and other documentation by discussing them explicitly, and by stating the most 
explanatory quotations. Also, with the idea of facilitating further research, I have organised 
the thesis thematically, in four chapters. In other words, in each of the four chapters the 
same chronology (1940-1945) is covered, but different aspects of British propaganda for 
Spain are analysed. This will, I hope, allow the reader to get acquainted with these four lines 
of action, which, though complementary to each other, are research topics in their own right. 
The first chapter analyses Sir Samuel Hoare’s continuous arguments over British opinion on 
Spain with Britons from all classes, including journalists, ministers, censors, propagandists, 
and politicians. The second chapter focuses on the British Embassy in Madrid, and a general 
overview is given on the initiatives, means, and channels of propaganda that derived from it. 
The third chapter examines the Embassy’s Religious Propaganda, one of the most original 
of the Embassy’s propaganda campaigns. Finally, the fourth chapter focuses on the 
Embassy’s Medical Service, a humanitarian initiative that, apart from causing an immense 
deal of good with regard to the Spanish population, also proved excellent means of 
propaganda for the Embassy’s propagandists. 
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CHAPTER I: 
SIR SAMUEL HOARE, ‘HAMMER OF THE PRESS’: 
BUILDING THE MONOPOLY OF BRITISH OPINION ON 
SPAIN 
‘With everything so obscure in the world, it is impossible even to foresee in rough 
outline what I shall be able to do in Spain. I can, however, imagine that the position 
may become very critical and it may be necessary to take urgent and drastic action. For 
instance, it might be necessary to spend really large sums upon propaganda and the 
development of trade with Spain.’  
(Sir Samuel Hoare to Lord Halifax, 27 May 1940)1 
 
1 .  Nazi Propaganda and the Spanish Press upon Hoare’s 
arrival to Spain 
Sir Samuel Hoare’s appointment was decided in April 1940 in view of the vital need to keep 
Spain out of the war or to defer its entry as much as possible. To this end, Britain needed a 
more experienced and prestigious public figure than the current ambassador, Sir Maurice 
Peterson, to represent British interests in Madrid. Hoare had been Home Secretary and 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and this was expected to cause a good impression upon 
Spanish officials.  
On 1 June, Hoare and Lady Maud Hoare arrived in Madrid via Bordeaux and Lisbon, with 
the only task of keeping ‘the British flag flying in a capital and a country which was already 
German-dominated.’2 Shortly after his arrival, Hoare wrote a letter3 saying that the Germans 
had ‘dug themselves in so deeply’ in Spain that his job would be an exceptionally difficult 
                                                
1 Sir Samuel Hoare, Ambassador on Special Mission (London, 1946), p. 29. 
2 John Arthur Cross, Sir Samuel Hoare, a Political Biography (London, 1977), pp. 322-323 and 333. 
3 Every document sent or received by Hoare will be referenced by simply stating to whom or from whom it was 
sent, depending on whether the ambassador was the sender or the addressee.  
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one.4 Penetrating all aspects of Spanish daily life, the omnipresence of the Nazis’ ‘tremendous 
propaganda machine’ in Spain was a issue for Hoare from the beginning:  
‘As an example of its strength I need only tell you that there are more than eighty 
officials in the Press Department of the German Embassy. The [Spanish] press is 
entirely in German hands and the German Ambassador now actually gives written 
instructions to the Spanish officials in the Press Department.’5 
Such Nazi influence in Spain can be explained both as a consequence of General Franco’s 
moral and material debt to Hitler after the Spanish Civil War, as well as by the Falange’s pro-
Nazism. In relation to the latter, Ramón Serrano Suñer, one of the most prominent Falangists 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs from October 1940 to September 1942, soon proved one of 
the major obstacles to Hoare’s plans of appeasement. According to the ambassador, Suñer 
was so sure of a German victory that he was doing his utmost to convince Franco to enter 
the war on the ‘winning side’, and was already appointing germanophiles to posts in the press 
and other public departments as preparations for the inevitable Axis victory.6 In addition, 
Hans Lazar, the German Embassy’s Chief of the Press Division, ‘had bought or intimidated 
into subservience to his country’s propaganda a substantial section of the Spanish press 
corps.’7 All of this resulted in the Spanish press being kidnapped by Nazi propaganda: 
‘With a truly German thoroughness they have chosen to leave them [the Spanish 
newspapers] only their names and to take their contents over, lock stock and barrel. 
The German Embassy in Madrid feeds them with their articles, censors their columns 
and turns them into sheets as completely Nazist and German as any that are published 
in Berlin or Frankfurt.’8 
While Nazi ideology flooded the Spanish press, British newspapers remained banned during 
most part of the war. The radio was also in hands of the Falange, who did ‘exactly what the 
                                                
4 To Cosmo G. Lang, Archbishop of Canterbury (6 June 1940); Cambridge University Library, Templewood 
Papers, box XIII, file 2, document No. 4. From now onwards I will use the same abbreviation the staff of the 
Cambridge University Library has used to categorise the Templewood Papers, i.e. XIII:2(4). 
5 To William P. Crozier, editor of The Manchester Guardian (8 November 1940); XIII:2(49). 
6 To Rab Butler, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (25 February 1941); XIII:18(7). 
7 Denis Smyth, Diplomacy and Strategy of Survival: British Policy and Franco’s Spain, 1940-41 (Cambridge, 1986), p. 36. 
8 To Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, ‘A Year and a half of Spanish Non-Belligerency’ (5 January 1942); 
XIII:22(2), p. 7. 
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Germans tell them to do’, that is to say, to convince Spaniards that Spain was ‘wedded to 
“Fascism”.’9 However, the influence of German propaganda, which grew from the days of 
the Civil War to ‘enormous proportions’ in 1943, went well beyond the circles of the Falange 
party. According to Tom F. Burns, Press Attaché of the British Embassy in Madrid, German 
propaganda utilised all channels possible:  
‘Gifts of money, motorcars and even houses were made to newspaper editors, and this 
preaching to the corrupted flourished exceedingly … recruiting Spanish labour for 
Germany, organising conferences, visits to Germany and occupied Europe, book 
imports, translation rights, newspaper sales, scholarships, radio campaigns, subsidised 
advertising, inspired articles in the press, and certain forms of espionage —in fact, all 
possible means of influence.’10 
 
2.  The Ministry of Information’s ‘boring communiqués’:  the 
first of Hoare’s Propaganda Measures 
The first of Hoare’s measures to counter Nazi propaganda concerned the official 
communiqués that were distributed by the Ministry of Information (MOI), which informed 
on the state of the war. Since, by the time Hoare arrived to Madrid, these communiqués were 
the only British document allowed in the Spanish press, the ambassador sought to improve 
them to turn them into pieces of propaganda. In this sense, he made two urgent requests to 
Alfred Duff Cooper, then Minister of Information. Firstly, the ambassador requested to ‘get 
more’ into the official communiqués:  
‘For instance, the Italians are daily making it appear in the Spanish press that they have 
swept us out of the Mediterranean. Would it be possible to have a special communiqué 
published from time to time resuming into one statement the heavy losses that the 
Italians are suffering?11 
                                                
9  [Memorandum,] ‘Some instances of unneutral facilities granted or not denied to the Axis, and of 
discrimination against British subjects and British interests’ (Undated, [c. end of 1943]); XIII:5(60), p. 6. 
10 OPC, ‘Planning Report. Part B. Channels’ (30 July 1944); XIII:7(21), pp. [12-13]. 
11 To Duff Cooper (12 July 1940); XIII:17(18). 
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The second request related to the fact that these communiqués were, according to Tom 
Burns, as exciting to read as ‘the jury verdict at an inquest’.12 Given that they were the only 
medium to tell Spaniards that the British were still on their feet, Hoare pressed the minister to 
‘put more body and life’ into them: 
‘Could you not therefore get more story into the communiqués? If I compare the 
German and British communiqués here, ours are so perfunctory as almost to escape 
notice, whilst the Germans are obviously using theirs as a valuable medium of 
propaganda.’13 
Hoare’s commitment to making these communiqués more appealing continued long after 
Duff Cooper was replaced by Brendan Bracken at the MOI, for the ambassador kept 
repeating the need to ‘make our communiqués readable and interesting instead of being short 
and perfunctory statements that fill no space in the press and stir no foreigner’s imagination.’ 
The ambassador, however, was well aware that these communiqués were far from sufficient 
to guarantee Spanish neutrality on their own. As he put it in a letter to Bracken: ‘[i]f 
continental opinion is to be converted into a belief in a British victory, it is essential to have a 
most carefully worked out programme of print, wireless and secret propaganda to prove to 
the world the certainty of a British victory.’14  
 
3.  ‘Making friends with Spain’:   
Defining Britain’s Position towards Franco’s Government 
Before a proper propaganda plan could be set up, Britain needed a clear and consistent 
approach to Franco’s Spain. Despite the great German influence on Spain, the ambassador 
realised very quickly that Spain was not in a position to go to war, nor did Franco want to risk 
his supremacy driving Spain into another conflict whose ‘result would inevitably be famine 
                                                
12 As cited by Hoare in a letter to Anthony Eden (1 May 1941); FO 371/26905.4802, PRO. Cited in Robert 
Cole, Britain and the War of Words, p. 76. 
13 To Duff Cooper (12 July 1940); XIII:17(18). 
14 To Brendan Bracken, Minister of Information (8 August 1941); XIII:18(54). 
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and an economic crisis … in which Franco would find it very difficult to keep his feet.’ Based 
on this idea, Hoare concluded that it was ‘a mistake to assume that Spain will go the way of 
Italy’ and that maintaining this line of thought would be ‘playing into the hands of the 
Germans, who are determined to force the country into war against its wish.’ Instead, Hoare 
adopted a strictly pragmatic attitude since all what Britain needed was ‘a Government that 
does not wish to go to war.’ The Foreign Office (FO) unreservedly supported Hoare’s idea of 
treating Franco’s Spain as a ‘potential friend’ rather than a ‘potential enemy’. However, the 
ambassador, a conservative politician himself, found substantial opposition within his own 
country, and particularly amongst his ‘friends of the Left’.15 
In a letter to the press tycoon Lord Beaverbrook, Hoare showed his concern about ‘the risk 
of falling between two stools’ in regards to Britain’s lack of unilateralism towards Spain. 
Hoare argued that if he was given the right cards, he could play his hand successfully, but 
‘only if we act quickly and give the appearance of acting in a friendly way.’ If, on the contrary, 
the British Left persisted in condemning Franco’s government as an actual enemy of Britain, 
then ‘my usefulness here comes completely to an end.’16  
Hoare’s difficult mission regarding British public opinion was to make it clear that to be in 
good terms with Franco’s Government did not mean supporting Fascism, but rather working 
towards Britain’s strategic objectives. This being so, the ambassador’s next challenge was to 
nurture the Anglo-Spanish ‘strategic friendship’ by making it clear to the British press that 
they ‘must not write Spain off as an inevitable enemy but rather regard it as a potential friend 
at present powerless and under enemy control, but possibly of great value to us in the 
future.’17 
                                                
15 To Lord Hankey (27 July 1940); XIII:17(28). 
16 Letter to Lord Beaverbrook (29 August 1940); XIII:17(41), and answer from Lord Beaverbrook (5 September 
1940); XIII:17(43). 
17 To Brendan Bracken (8 August 1941); XIII:18(54). 
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4. ‘What a Nuisance this Correspondents are! ’ :   
Hoare’s Reprimands to the British Press  
Hoare sent dozens of letters of reprimand to whoever attempted to publicly criticise Franco’s 
Government since these hostilities hindered his plans for Anglo-Spanish rapprochement.18 
On one occasion, the ambassador reproached Sir Walter Layton for an article he had 
published in the New Chronicle criticising Rab Butler —then Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs— for his ‘apparent friendliness’ towards the Franco Government: 
‘The loss of the Iberian Peninsula to our enemies would be a blow the gravity of which 
you can easily appreciate … It seems to me therefore essential that whatever opinions 
we may have had of the rights and wrongs of the Civil War we should do and say 
nothing at this moment that will either weaken or alienate the present Government 
here. This is not a counsel of weakness nor is it in any way evidence of our sympathy 
with a dictator. It is simply elementary prudence at a very dangerous moment in the 
national life. Do ponder over this position and if you think that there is substance in 
what I say, go quietly for the time being in this very delicate situation.’19  
In view that Sir Walter Layton did not amend his line of thought, Hoare wrote directly to 
Winston Churchill imploring him to do the possible to restrain Mr. Layton —‘and one or two 
other of the journalists of the Left’— from treating Spain as a declared enemy, since ‘[t]he 
more this assumption is made in London, the more difficult it is to convince Franco and his 
friends that we don’t wish to destroy them.’20 Hoare’s stubbornness was not accidental. The 
Nazi propagandists often cited articles such as Layton’s in the Spanish media —with now few 
exaggerations— in order to prove their claims that Britain was Spain’s natural enemy. On 
another occasion, Hoare wrote to Lord Beaverbrook exposing the great trouble caused by an 
article published in the Evening Standard had caused in Spain. Once again, Hoare emphasised 
                                                
18 Apart from those cited in this chapter, see also his letters to W.P. Crozier (12 July 1940); Lord Beaverbrook 
(12 July 1940); XIII:17(17); XIII:2(16); Brendan Bracken (30 July 1940); XIII:17(30); Beverley Baxter (3 
September 1940); XIII:2(27); J.L. Garvin, editor of The Observer (30 December 1940); XIII:2(60); and 
Churchill (20 October 1943); XIII:16(39). 
19 To Sir Walter Layton (4 July 1940); XIII:2(11). 
20 To Churchill (22 July 1940); XIII:16(6). Hoare also urged the Prime Minister to stop the British press 
personal attacks against him and his Spanish mission; see letter to Churchill (5 July 1940); XIII:16(4), and 
Churchill's answer (14 July 1940); XIII:16(5). 
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what by then had already become his personal mantra, namely, the need to  ‘get it into their 
heads’ that ‘if we play our cards wisely Spain may end up becoming Britain’s friendly 
neutral.’21 
A month later, Lord Beaverbrook received another telegram from the ambassador regarding a 
Daily Express article signed by E.J. Robertson and entitled ‘The Three Dictatorships’, which 
was ‘doing us grave injury.’ By Falange initiative, a Spanish translation of this article, which 
was manifestly hostile to Franco’s Spain, was being officially circulated to all the ministries. 
Hoare begged Lord Beaverbrook to do something —‘Please help me’— in order to avoid 
these type of initiatives by the most pro-Axis elements in Spain .22 In another letter to E.J. 
Robertson, author of the article and Lord Beaverbrook’s newspapers general manager, Hoare 
reiterated that: 
‘The more we imply that she [Spain] is our certain enemy and is going the way of Italy, 
the more we play into the hands of the German agents provocateurs [sic] who wish to 
embroil us … This is what matters to us, namely a Government, whether of the Right, 
the Left or the Centre, it does not matter, but a Government that wishes to keep out of 
war. If our friends of the Left succeeded in destroying the Franco Government they 
certainly would not get a government to their liking. All that would happen would be 
chaos, internal disorder and the immediate intervention of the Germans and Italians. 
This is the situation that I want to avoid.’23 
Occasionally, the ambassador also lost his temper. When scolding G.M Thomson for having 
‘over-dramatized Franco’s speech’, Sir Samuel blurted out: ‘Anyhow I do not at all want to 
argue the incident with you any more … all I ask is that you should remember that I am 
walking at ice edge.’24 
Hoare was not the only one embarrassed by the lines published in British journals. On one 
occasion, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar wrote to the ambassador imploring him to keep British 
                                                
21 To Lord Beaverbrook (17 July 1940); XIII:17(22). 
22 Telegram to Lord Beaverbrook (26 August 1940); XIII:17(40). See also letter to Lord Beaverbrook (6 
September 1940); XIII:17(45). 
23 To E.J. Robertson, from the Daily Express (27 July 1940); XIII:2(19). 
24 To G.M. Thomson (24 September 1940); XIII:2(36). 
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correspondence ‘quiet’ about Spanish affairs, and suggesting that the less they talked about 
Spain, the better it would be for both Britain and Portugal.25  Spurred on by the Portuguese 
dictator’s words, Hoare sent a short message to Sir Ronald Campbell, British Ambassador in 
Lisbon, which began with a tough ‘I wonder whether you could restrain the Times 
correspondent [in Lisbon] in his messages about Spain’, and concluded: ‘[w]hat a nuisance 
these correspondents are!’26 
In spite of everything, written press was not the only cause of Hoare’s concerns. In a letter to 
the FO, Hoare explained that the Germans were ‘exploiting to the full’ in the Spanish press 
the photographs published in Britain depicting the London air-raid damages, which did, 
according to Hoare, ‘a great deal of harm’ in Spain. These photographs, originally from the 
Illustrated London News, had been strategically included in the Nazi-controlled Spanish 
newspaper ABC to give the impression that London ‘had been laid flat with the ground.’27 
For Sir Samuel, suppressing these photographs in the British press was a minor change of 
significant importance for Spain’s foreign policy at a time in which the Wehrmacht was already 
at the Pyrenees. 
 
5. Sir Samuel Hoare and the ‘War of Rumours’ :   
Combatting German (and British) Black Propaganda  
In addition to the ‘white’ propaganda means (official, with a recognisable source), the Nazis 
also made use of the ‘grey’ (rumours with dubious or unstated source) and ‘black’ 
(deliberately false rumours used to mislead the enemy) propaganda methods in Spain. 
Obviously, these rumours’ ultimate goal was to drag Spain into the war. They usually claimed 
to be the word of the Spanish or British governments, even though most Spanish officials 
                                                
25 To Anthony Eden (4 May 1941); XIII:21(22). 
26 To Sir Ronald Campbell (20 May 1941); XIII:11(3). 
27 To Anthony Eden (22 January 1941); XIII:21(12). 
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were, in Hoare’s own words, as ‘anxious to keep Spain out of the war’ as were the British.28 
The spread of ‘so many alarmist and often contradictory rumours’ by the Nazi agents soon 
became so overwhelming that the ambassador stated: ‘I have almost given up making any 
comments upon them.’29 
The Germans used the ‘war of nerves’ uninterruptedly until the end of the war. In May 1943, 
for instance, this ‘black’ propaganda took the form of an American occupation of Tangier 
and a British invasion of Cataluña. This caused a lot of trouble to the American and British 
ambassadors, who had to explain time after time to the then Spanish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Francisco Gómez-Jordana, that they were not going to break their friendly pledges.30  
There were also spontaneous attempts from British individuals to use these ‘dark’ methods of 
propaganda. Hoare reproached all of them, and censored the spreading of rumours and 
unauthorised propaganda leaflets in Spain as firm as he had opposed every single anti-Spanish 
column in the British press. The reason why is quite simple, for these initiatives hampered 
Hoare’s relations with Franco’s Government and were on the verge of driving Spain into the 
war several times. The ambassador was extremely perseverant in scolding all those British 
individuals who circulated their own unauthorised propaganda in the belief that they were 
helping the British cause. Very frequently, the ambassador complained to the MOI about 
leaflets that were being spread from Gibraltar to various points in Spain and that, after being 
discovered by the Spanish authorities, endangered British policy towards Spain:  
‘I have moved heaven and earth to keep Spain out of the war and the whole of this 
time I have been skating on the thinnest possible ice. If I am still to keep going and the 
British policy of keeping Spain out of the war is to be maintained, I must not have the 
ice broken in front of me by other people.’31  
                                                
28 To Clive Liddell (22 July 1941); XIII:9(6). See also answer from Liddell (25 July 1940); XIII:9(7). 
29 To Viscount Gort (28 November 1941); XIII:9(26). 
30 To Mason-MacFarlane (19 May 1943); XIII:9(42). Regarding the German’s rumours and attacks on Hoare see 
letter to Brendan Bracken (17 May 1943); XIII:19(12)[duplicated].    
31 To Brendan Bracken (15 September 1941); XIII:18(74). 
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An even more tense situation occurred in December 1941, when the British Embassy in 
Lisbon telegraphed Gibraltar assuring that Nicolás Franco, brother of the Generalísimo and 
Spanish ambassador to Lisbon, had given Salazar a letter from his brother assuring that 
Gibraltar was to be attacked ‘at once.’ After retaking the reins of normality, Hoare wrote an 
irritated letter to ambassador Campbell requesting him that ‘whatever be the assessment, 
reports of this kind dealing with Spain should, if possible, be sent to me for my comments 
before they are circulated about the world.’32  
 
6. Censorship and the Ambassador: the Ministry of 
Information, and the BBC 
Already from the summer of 1940, and as in the case of the MOI’s official communiqués, 
Hoare also tried to improve the BBC’s ‘efficiency’ in Spain. In a letter to the BBC’s Director-
General, Sir Samuel requested that more broadcasts were dedicated to Spain, ‘the only 
country left upon the continent with a note of interrogation after it as to its attitude in the 
future.’33 The ambassador attempted as well to correct the BBC’s continuous deviations from 
the FO’s and his own line of thought regarding Spain. As late as November 1944, Hoare was 
still battling against the lack of consensus and the BBC’s ‘constant policy of hostility and not 
infrequently of misrepresentation’, which left him and his embassy ‘without a leg to stand 
on.’34 Burns, summarised the gravity of this issue as follows: 
‘To be truly consistent, non-intervention would have to be carried right through our 
propaganda as well as our policy. But it seems inexorably to break down there. In our 
broadcasts to Spain the general line of our propaganda is so divergent from our main 
policy as to constitute a policy all on its own … It is not surprising if Spaniards … find 
it impossible to give credit to our non-intervention policy when it is belied by our 
                                                
32 To Sir Ronald Campbell (15 December 1941); XIII:11(11). See also answer from Capmbell ([26?] December 
1941); XIII:11(12). 
33 To Frederick W. Ogilvie, Director-General of the BBC (22 July 1940); XIII:2(18) 
34 From Burns to Keneth Grubb (7 November 1944); XIII:7(44). 
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broadcast propaganda. Equally, the Spanish people can hardly believe our broadcast 
propaganda when it is belied by our official policy.’35 
One illustrative case of how this incongruence threatened Hoare’s Madrid mission occurred 
when the BBC mocked the Spanish Blue Division while it was fighting in Russia, even though 
‘Spaniards generally were beginning to laugh at the Division and to think of these young men 
as very courageous but nevertheless foolish and irresponsible.’ As a consequence of these 
insults, ‘[o]utraged parents, most of them pro-British, have protested to me and the only way 
I have been able to get out of the affair is to say that it could not have been the B.B.C. but 
must have been German propaganda.’36 
On another occasion, minister Gómez-Jordana showed his ‘displeasure, not unmixed with 
surprise’ regarding the BBC’s tone adopted while discussing the declarations made by Franco, 
who rarely gave an interview, to a United Press representative. The minister also warned Hoare 
that ‘this attitude of persistent hostility towards Spain’ was the reason why all the 
unfavourable broadcasts from stations of unknown origin and unfriendly content were 
continuously being attributed to the BBC.37 This sort of events had disastrous effects for 
Hoare’s relations with the Spanish officials, who went through these broadcasts with a thin-
tooth comb even in the later stages of the war. For them, according to Hoare, every word 
that the BBC said was thought to be a ‘considered and approved statement of H.M.G.’: 
‘In view of this, I am put into a very embarrassing position here when, under 
instructions from London. I repeat assurances that we do not wish to meddle in 
internal Spanish affairs and, at the same time, the B.B.C. starts attacking, directly or 
indirectly, the Franco régime.’38 
In parallel to improving British broadcasts in Spain, Hoare also made great efforts to harden 
the MOI’s censorship standards. Often, this involved not only stopping the exportation of 
printed publications that compromised Hoare’s negotiations in Madrid, but also preventing 
                                                
35 [Burns,] ‘Spanish Politics and British Propaganda: Stocktaking’ (November 1944); XIII:7(47), p. 3. 
36 To Brendan Bracken (15 September 1941); XIII:18(74). 
37 [Sir Samuel Hoare,] ‘Aide-Mémoire’ (undated [c. August 1944]); XIII:7(27), 2 pp. 
38 To Brendan Bracken (4 February 1944); XIII:19(35). 
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their distribution within Britain.39 This was the case of Charles Duff, a fervent opponent of 
Franco’s Spain, and his ‘really objectionable publications’.40 The following is an extract from 
Hoare’s letter to the MOI regarding this issue: 
‘If you can, keep an eye on these things and get it into the heads of the Censorship and 
the Ministry of Information that if they really wish to keep Spain out of the war, they 
cannot be too cautious in dealing with news for Spain. Ever since I have been here, I 
have felt that I have had many reasons to doubt the Judgment and wisdom of the 
Ministry of Information and particularly of the B.B.C. No doubt they are all greatly 
provoked by Suñer and his press. But surely I am provoked much more by the 
Spaniards, and if in the interests of British policy I remain a martyr to the virtue of 
patience, they ought to follow my example.’41  
Hoare’s constant complaints to the BBC and the MOI provoked no few reactions against his 
‘appeasement’ policy. Alexander Cagodan, Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 
once objected that ‘[w]e can’t forever go on giving the impression through our avoiding 
irritating the Spanish government that we approve dictatorial Fascist regimes.’42 Equally 
annoyed by the Sir Samuel’s criticisms, Duff Cooper, from the MOI, lost his nerves and 
accused Hoare of ‘burying his head … in the sands of appeasement’, while emphasising that 
the BBC had the public duty to give news to the world even if this hardened the situation for 
‘certain ambassadors’.43  
 
 
                                                
39 To Viscount Halifax (30 July 1940); XIII:20(30). 
40 Charles Duff, A Key to Victory: Spain (London: Victor Gollancz, 1940) and his journal Voice of Spain, both of 
which argued for the overthrowing of all the totalitarian regimes including Franco’s Spain. 
41 To Rab Butler (22 May 1941); XIII:18(33). 
42 Cadogan to Hoare (25 November 1942); FO 371/31223.11802. Cited in Robert Cole, Britain and the War of 
Words, p. 118. 
43 Duff Cooper to Anthony Eden (28 April 1941); FO 371/26951.5051, PRO. Cited in Robert Cole, Britain and 
the War of Words, p. 76. 
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CHAPTER II: 
THE EMBASSY’S PRESS OFFICE:  
THE HEART OF BRITISH PROPAGANDA IN SPAIN 
 
‘With great difficulty we built up here a reasonably good Ministry of Information 
organisation. Burns and his second man, Malley, are absolutely first-class. Their 
work has been extremely difficult, as they have been impeded at every turn by 
Suñer and the Germans. However, by using every conceivable device we have now 
got a biggish circulation of our bulletins.’  
Sir Samuel Hoare to Brendan Bracken (4 September 1941).1  
 
1 .  Captain Hillgarth and the Reorganisation of the 
Embassy to Wartime Standards 
In May 1940, while preparing his arrival in Madrid, the newly appointed ambassador had 
requested from Captain Alan Hillgarth, the Embassy’s Naval Attaché, a report expressing 
his view on the current position of British representation in Spain.2 Hillgarth’s report was, 
following Hoare’s instructions, full of frankness and criticisms regarding the functioning 
of the Embassy and how to improve its wartime efficiency. Hillgarth put it very boldly: 
‘the Embassy Your Excellency has come to command is defeatist.’ According to the 
Naval Attaché, the staff had, for the first eight months of the war, ‘behaved exactly as if 
the war were a distant matter’, and ‘refused to take into practical account the fact that we 
are at war.’ 
The situation was urgent. The British mission in Madrid needed a ‘drastic reorganisation 
of the Embassy Staff, of the work and of the premises.’ The first of his suggestions was 
to rearrange the Press Department, which was ‘inefficient’ although ‘not entirely through 
its own fault’: 
                                                
1 To Brendan Bracken (4 September 1941); XIII:18(70). 
2 This section is based on Alan Hillgarth’s memorandum to Hoare (2 June 1940); XIII:2(3), pp. 1-9. 
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‘We issue leaflets, and we are prevented by the authorities from circulating them by 
post … Our wireless broadcasts in Spanish are not bad, but we occasionally say 
things that might be expressly calculated to annoy the Spanish people or to 
misrepresent our actions. Our film releases in Spain are deplorable. The French are 
one thousand per cent better than we are … we do not issue special Spanish 
supplements. We make no attempt really to counteract German lies. We are 
content to say we can’t do it … a special attempt should be made to present British 
news … more attractively to Spanish readers.’ 
Hillgarth also posed the problem that the Embassy’s speed was not ‘keyed to war-time 
requirements’, and that the ‘leisurely methods’ of peacetime diplomacy were useless in 
that situation. Amongst the urgent measures to be taken he mentioned the need to 
increase the number of cypher staff and their working rate; to circulate instructions from 
London in a controlled manner amongst the Embassy staff; and to replace the current 
‘amateurish’ working pattern by a clear division of labour. 
Hillgarth did not hide the incontestable fact that Britain and Spain had no traditional 
friendship, and that His Majesty’s Government had treated Spain ‘very stupidly’ in recent 
times. As a consequence, the British —‘not as individuals but as a nation’— were hated 
in Spain, and, promoted by German and Italian propaganda, they were also being 
increasingly distrusted. Overall, Captain Hillgarth’s proposed reforms were best suited to 
keep Franco out of the war,    
‘And if Spain goes in anyhow, well, we have tried to prevent it and we can deal 
with Spain if she insists on making a fool of herself. There are among us too many 
signs of panic. There is no need for it, though there is need for resolution and 
action.’ 
 
2.  Defining a Plan of Propaganda for Spain:  
Aims and Objectives 
From the beginning, the most immediate ‘aims’ of the Overseas Planning Committee 
(OPC) regarding the Iberian Peninsula were ‘to prevent Spain from willingly becoming a 
base for military operations’; and, if invaded, to ‘prepare Spaniards to make the path of 
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the invader as difficult and dangerous as possible.’ The main ‘objectives’ of these 
propaganda plans were to counter the idea of ‘German invincibility’ and to weaken the 
power of the Falange —without destroying it, since it would pose a useful resistance to a 
hypothetical invasion. In order to achieve these objectives, British propaganda should 
convince the Spaniards that they were better fighters than the Germans; that Britain and 
America were economically, militarily, and technologically superior to the Germans; and 
that Germany could not provide Spain with the raw materials that Britain and America 
were currently supplying.3 
As the war went on and Spain’s entry into the war seemed less likely, the original plan for 
propaganda was reviewed and adapted to the new situation. Hence, in a revision of 
October 1943, the aims were divided in ‘long-term’ and ‘short-term’. The long-term aim 
was to bring Spain into the orbit of the Allies as a ‘sympathetic neutral’. More concrete 
than this were the short-term aims: to counter German influence and totalitarian ideas in 
Spain, to back the Allies’ plans for economic collaboration, and to promote Spanish 
resistance movements in the event of an Axis invasion. This revised report also identified 
nine objectives. Most of them aimed to combat the effects of Nazi propaganda on 
Britain’s weakened image and to convince Spanish opinion that Britain would play a 
leading role in post-war Europe. Some others aimed to make the Spaniards realise that 
their economic prosperity depends upon the Allies, and, very importantly, that an Ally 
victory will not mean the Bolshevisation of Europe. In relation to this last point the 
report warned that, due to the atrocities of the civil war, Spain constituted ‘the most 
fertile field in all Europe’ for Nazi propaganda regarding the ‘Red Peril’, and that 
countering this propaganda was ‘the most difficult task we have to face in Spain.’ In fact, 
the last of the objectives aimed to prove that the so-called ‘Red Peril’ was really a ‘Nazi 
                                                
3 OPC, ‘Plan for Propaganda in Spain’ (17 December 1941); FO 371/26953.14051, PRO. Cited in Robert 
Cole, Britain and the War of Words , pp. 98-99. 
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peril’, by identifying the Falange party as a tool in hands of the Nazis and Nazi Germany 
as the ‘implacable enemy of Christianity’.4 
 
3.  The Embassy’s Press Office:  
Propaganda Staff and Division of Labour    
Following Hillgarth’s suggestions, and in order to attain the objectives described above, 
the Embassy’s Press Office (EPO) suffered a serious reorganisation that made it the 
centre of British propaganda within Spain. The man responsible for the EPO was the 
Embassy’s Press Attaché and first secretary Tom F. Burns. In Hoare’s words, it was 
Burns that had ‘developed an organisation from almost nothing to something very big’ at 
the same time he made himself one of Spain’s most popular personalities.5  
Burns had three assistants. Bernard Malley, with a large network of personal contacts, 
was the man in charge of the Embassy’s religious propaganda, as well as the Embassy’s 
Medical Service, in which he was assisted by a nurse and a dispenser (chapters 3 and 4 are 
dedicated to these two special sections). Burns’ second assistant was J. Walter, who was 
originally responsible for the publication of the Embassy bulletin, BBC bulletins in 
Spanish and English, the British Official News, the Liberation News, and the Northern Bulletin, 
a weekly sheet circulated clandestinely in Vizcaya and Cataluña. Walter was later replaced 
by J.M.N. Jeffries at the bulletins section and became Burn’s deputy ‘in all maters 
concerning general administration except those specifically covered by Malley and 
Stordy.’ J. Stordy, Burn’s third assistant, was responsible for the BBC broadcasts and 
                                                
4 OPC, ‘Plan of propaganda for Spain. Third Revision of Policy Plan’ (6 October 1943); XIII: 6(2iii), pp. 1-
6. See also ‘Addendum to Appreciation’ (2 October 1943); XIII:6(2ii), pp. 1-2. 
5 To Brendan Bracken (19 October 1944); XIII:7(39). 
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advertising, and was assisted by five monitors, three for the BBC programmes in Spanish 
and two for broadcasts in German.6 
The rest of the EPO’s personnel was formed by Señor Balbuena, Press Liaison Officer, 
who was the EPO’s contact with the Spanish press and supplied them with written and 
photographic material; as well as an accountant, a registrar, clerical assistants, an archivist, 
two telephone operators, four shorthand-typist and five messenger boys. The general 
trend seen in the consecutive reports is that the EPO grew in parallel to the war, even 
thought the number of British staff employed at the Madrid Embassy was rigorously 
limited by the Spanish Authorities.7 By July 1944, for example, there were ‘ten hands’ 
working non-stop at the printing department on day and night shifts. In addition, the 
EPO also opened a less staffed Press Office at the British Consulate in Barcelona, and 
paid clerks to help with propaganda distribution in the cities of Alicante, Algeciras, 
Almería, Bilbao, Cádiz, Cartagena, Coruña, Gandía, Gibraltar, Granada, Málaga, Palma, 
Tenerife, Valencia and Vigo.8 
 
4. The Embassy Press Office:  
Channels of Propaganda and Modus Operandi 
(The following information is based on the two OPC reports of October 19439 and July 
1944 10 , and completed with Burn’s report from August 1944 11 . The two special 
departments that appear in these reports under the title of ‘Personal Contacts’, i.e. the 
                                                
6 Why did Stordy require two monitors for broadcasts in German? It may be the case that there was an 
Embassy-led radio station which broadcasted ‘black propaganda’ (i.e. false rumours) to confuse the Nazis, 
although I have not found further proof of this. 
7 OPC, ‘Plan of Propaganda for Spain. Second Revision of Channels’ (20 October 1943); XIII:6(2v), p. 1. 
8 Information gathered from ‘Appendix A’ from the OPC, ‘Plan of Propaganda for Spain. Second 
Revision of Channels’ (20 October 1943), XIII:6(2v); and completed with  ‘Appendix A’ of the update to 
the ‘Planning Report’ as of 30 June (30 July 1944); XIII:7(21), 2 pp.  
9 OPC, ‘Plan of Propaganda for Spain. Second Revision of Channels’ (20 October 1943); XIII:6(2v), pp. 1-
8 and two appendices. 'Appendix A' (1 p.) gives a detailed account of the staff of the Madrid press office 
whereas ‘Appendix B' (2 pp.) analyses the principal Spanish newspapers and periodicals. 
10 OPC, ‘Planning Report. Part B. Channels’ (30 July 1944); XIII:7(21). 
11 Burns, ‘British Propaganda in Spain in 1943’ (22 August 1944); XIII:23(41)[c]. 
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Embassy’s Religious Propaganda and the Embassy’s Medical Service, will be later 
analysed in chapters 3 and 4) 
a) Radio 
Although Spain had just over 300,000 licensed radio sets by October 1943, it is estimated 
that this represented only one fifth of the total number of sets within the country (i.e. 
1,500,000). However, since several people often shared a set, ‘it seems probable that a 
fairly accurate account of it reaches between 4 and 5 million people by one means or 
another’. Nonetheless, from December 1943 onwards, the Spanish authorities issued a 
new decree that made the system of licensing and the sale of sets much more difficult, 
with the aim of having a detailed record of all set owners and their sets’ power.12  
The BBC’s daily news programme for Spain in Spanish ran without intermission from 
8.15 am to 22.15 pm, including fifteen minutes devoted to American news. However, it 
was the late night broadcast Voz de Londres that had the largest audience. Salvador de 
Madariaga’s recorded talks from Latin America and other ‘satirical exposures of Axis 
propaganda’ had also a very good reception amongst Spaniards. Saturday nights were 
devoted to answering the listeners’ questions, whereas Sunday nights were reserved for 
the London Commentary. Cultural, music and all other programmes not related to the 
European conflict had a significantly lower audience, since tuning up the BBC was a risky 
and therefore selective activity. 
b) Press Articles and Photographs 
Although the Spanish press was inaccessible for foreign —i.e. Ally— propaganda13, the 
figures show that from April 1942 they started to publish an increasing number of British 
official communiqués and press articles. By that time, the EPO also published an average 
                                                
12 OPC, ‘Planning Report. Part B. Channels’ (30 July 1944); XIII:7(21), p. [3]. 
13 For an extensive analysis of the Spanish Press see ‘Addendum to Appreciation’ (2 October 1943); 
XIII:6(2ii), pp. 1-2; and ‘Appendix B’; XIII:6(2v). 
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of 24 photographs per month in the Spanish journals, although these figures increased 
dramatically overnight. By 1943, the EPO was placing at least an article a day and some 
300 photographs a month, and in the last five months of 1943 it achieved a ‘record’ of 
230 articles and 2,300 photographs in the Spanish press.14 This trend continued through 
the first five months of 1944, with 2,322 photographs published, as opposed to 907 in 
the corresponding months of the previous year.15  
c) Printed Material 
Printed propaganda included special Spanish paper editions of War in Pictures (16,400 per 
issue) and a Spanish-Portuguese edition of Neptune (1,000), which were imported by 
diplomatic bag from Lisbon in order to avoid Spanish propaganda restrictions. 
Additionally, the fortnightly English Catholic News Letter, was printed and distributed in 
Spanish from Gibraltar. The EPO’s clerks spread throughout the whole Spanish territory 
(see Chapter II.3) also collaborated in the distribution of political pamphlets such as the 
Spanish translation of the Beveridge Plan (20,000), as well as maps (‘in great demand’, up 
to 5,000 per issue) and posters (30 per issue). In addition, the MOI arranged Spanish 
editions of a selection of books that were freely distributed, whereas the British Council 
widely granted British rights of publication so that the Spaniards themselves could print 
their own books.16  
Printed materials distribution also increased throughout the war, with 20,000 items being 
circulated in October 1943 alone, which meant an increase of 75% over October 1942.17 
This positive trend continued during 1944, with new titles being distributed by the EPO: 
Mundo Grafico (Portuguese propaganda, 2,500 copies), Illustrated London News (1,200), 
                                                
14 Burns, ‘British Propaganda’, p. 1. 
15 OPC, ‘Planning Report. Part B. Channels’ (30 July 1944); XIII:7(21), p. [7]. 
16 OPC, ‘Plan of Propaganda for Spain. Second Revision of Channels.’ (20 October 1943); XIII:6(2v), pp. 
6-7. 
17 Burns, ‘British Propaganda’, p. 1. 
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Sphere (1,200), Times Weekly Miniature Edition (1,500), Flight (150), and The Economist (130), 
amongst others.18 
The EPO published three distinct bulletins every day, one for the Spanish authorities and 
two for the masses, both in Spanish and in English. By mid-1944, the bulletin for 
government officials had considerably increased its 1943 circulation (from 4,000 to 
8,000), and so did the number of bulletins for the general public in Spanish (from 25,000 
to 45,000) and in English (2,000 to 2,600). The EPO was also responsible for a weekly 
bulletin and another one published each three weeks, which were not printed in the 
office but rather handled entirely by Spaniards.19 
d) Film Propaganda and the ‘Embassy cinema’ 
Although cinema-going was an ‘established habit of the Spaniards’, it was not the most 
ideal channel for either Ally or Axis propaganda since only films of a non-propaganda 
character were shown in Spanish cinemas. The Spanish National newsreel NO-DO was 
the only and compulsory piece of propaganda shown in all cinemas in Spain. However, 
the NO-DO was virtually a piece of Nazi propaganda since it was totally dominated by 
German war material at least until the Normandy landings, when the use of British 
material in the Spanish newsreel suddenly skyrocketed. For instance, the 20 October 
1944 edition of the NO-DO was, in Burns’ words, ‘a British triumph’, since it only 
showed one German war item as opposed to British footages from the liberation of 
Marseilles, Lyon, and Antwerp, as well as the meeting between Churchill and President 
Roosevelt in Quebec.20  
                                                
18 OPC, ‘Planning Report. Part B. Channels’ (30 July 1944); XIII:7(21), p. [8]. 
19 Burns, ‘British Propaganda’, p. 1. 
20 Burns to MOI (20 October 1944); INF 1/575, PRO. Cited in Robert Cole, Britain and the War of Words, p. 
163. 
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With the aim of circumventing Spanish restrictions on film propaganda the EPO started 
the so-called ‘Embassy cinema’ initiative. Originally, films were shown three to four 
times a week to an audience of up to 180 guests. This small group, however, had a more 
important propaganda effect than its size might suggest, since the invitations were 
deliberately sent to ‘the social and diplomatic sets, literary and “intelligentsia”, film and 
press, professional classes, British and Spanish business men.’ The Embassy cinema soon 
became so popular that by the end of 1942 it was showing the same programme up to 
fourteen times.21 This growing tendency continued during 1943 with up to 3,000 regular 
viewers, which provided the EPO with ‘invaluable means of contact with people in every 
walk of life.’22 Due to this huge success, the EPO started similar cinema initiatives at the 
Consular offices in Barcelona, Santander and San Sebastián.23   
e) Obstacles and Difficulties to British Propaganda 
From the beginning of the war, the Falange party had most censorship competences 
within Spain since it was in charge of the Vicesecretaría de Educación Popular, Delegación 
Nacional de Prensa y Propaganda (Vice-Secretariat for Popular Education’s Department of 
Press and Propaganda). The Falange-led censorship was in practice Nazi-led, which 
turned disastrous for British propaganda and gave ample freedom for German material. 
Paradoxically, as Hoare once explained, this ‘German domination’ was instilling a 
growing feeling of ‘Spanish independence’ amongst Spaniards. Hence, under Hoare’s 
leadership, the British Embassy rapidly became ‘the centre of this growing feeling of 
Spanish independence.’ 24  From the moment Gómez-Jordana replaced Suñer at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in September 1942, the Falange’s control of foreign press 
                                                
21 OPC, ‘Plan of Propaganda for Spain. Second Revision of Channels’ (20 October 1943); XIII:6(2v), pp. 
7-8. 
22 Burns, ‘British Propaganda’, p. 1. 
23 OPC, ‘Planning Report. Part B. Channels’ (30 July 1944); XIII:7(21), p. [9]. 
24 To Anthony Eden (24 December 1940); XIII:21(4) [wrongly catalogued as XIII:21(3)] 
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started to weaken, resulting in a certain improvement in the tone of the Spanish press 
towards the Britain and British propaganda.25 
Whether it was due to Falange or ministerial initiative, the Embassy had to face 
numerous campaigns against its propaganda. Regarding the radio, for example, there 
were two main types of ‘official interferences’. Firstly, even though there was no 
approved ban on listening to foreign broadcasts, the Spanish authorities continuously 
‘jammed’ the BBC Spanish broadcasts ‘from local stations (particularly those under 
Falange control) from military, naval and air force personnel, from telegraph operators 
and from Axis agents.’ The second way to weaken British broadcasts was the 
‘intimidation of listeners’, which made listening to the BBC ‘a serious matter’ since it 
provided with ‘evidence of “red” politics and political activity’.26 This menaces also 
applied to those consuming printed propaganda. As Burns described: 
‘People found leaving the Press Department with bulletins were on occasion 
arrested, man-handled and imprisoned or fined. There were reports of houses 
broken into by gangs of Falangistas and wireless sets smashed. In all parts of Spain 
Consular buildings were on occasion picketed by armed police or Falange 
members who acted in such a way as to prevent people from visiting the premises.’  
Whenever the ambassador protested against these acts he always got the same response 
from the Spanish authorities, namely, that the dissemination of British news amongst the 
lower classes constituted a menace to law and order and that enthusiasts of British 
propaganda were not infrequently also enemies of the State. Nonetheless, it was not only 
the Spaniards who were persecuted in relation to British propaganda. Some other 
initiatives were directed against the embassy and the consular employees themselves. In 
Barcelona, Gandía, Sevilla and Valencia, diplomatic personnel were spontaneously 
                                                
25 OPC, ‘Plan of Propaganda for Spain. Revision of Appreciation’ (20 October 1943); XIII:6(2iv), p. 5. 
26 OPC, ‘Plan of Propaganda for Spain. Second Revision of Channels’ (20 October 1943); XIII:6(2v), pp. 
2-4. 
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arrested by the police and ‘Falange ruffians’, ill-treated in local police stations, and then 
let off with threats and fines. 
Lastly, the EPO had also to face a ‘continuous and widespread’ campaign that aimed to 
intercept and destroy British propaganda. Material accepted for posting in Madrid was 
later found ‘on its way to the pulping machine’. In order to circumvent this sabotage, the 
EPO was forced to change its methods of distribution and organise a clandestine system 
of couriers in areas of Madrid other than the centre.27  
                                                
27 Burns, ‘British Propaganda in Spain in 1943’ (22 August 1944); XIII:23(41)[c], pp. 2-3. 
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CHAPTER III: 
‘GOD HELPS THOSE WHO HELP THEMSELVES’:  
THE EMBASSY’S RELIGIOUS PROPAGANDA  
 
‘We know that our religious propaganda is causing much concern to the enemy here. It 
is a difficult matter for them to interfere in. They dare not attack the Spanish clergy 
directly and anyhow they have a very bad case. But it is a matter of urgency. We must 
not let the moment pass. We must have vast quantities of printed matter, and it must be 
distributed.’  
(Bernard Malley, 23 June 1942)1 
 
1 .  Enlisting the Spanish Clergy in the Embassy’s ‘Crusade 
against Nazism’ 
In May 1940, shortly before Hoare’s departure for Spain, he visited the catholic archbishop 
William Godfrey with the intention of enlisting the help of the British clergy in his ‘special 
mission’. Following the meeting, Godfrey sent several letters of introduction to Cardinal 
Gomá and Cardinal Segura, archbishops of Toledo and Seville respectively, as well as to other 
influential religious personalities. To Luigi Maglione, Cardinal Secretary of State, Godfrey 
explained the nature of Hoare’s ‘mission’ and emphasised the ‘significance of this 
appointment’ for the religious community.2 To Gaetano Cicognani, the Nuncio in Madrid, 
Godfrey emphasised the fact that Sir Samuel had been Foreign Affairs Minister during the 
Italo-Abisinian conflict, and a conservative politician who ‘mai nascose le sue simpatie per la 
causa nazionalista’ during the Spanish Civil War.3 Lastly, in a more familiar tone, Godfrey 
                                                
1 Malley, ‘Memorandum’ (23 June 1942); XIII:19(36)[b], p. 3. 
2 From William Godfrey, Archbishop of Cius (24 May 1940); XIII:1.b(11). 
3 ‘Who never hid his sympathy for the nationalist cause’; in letter from William Godfrey to Gaetano Cicognani, 
Nuncio in Madrid (27 May 1940); XIII:1.b(13). In a letter to Cosmo G. Lang, Archbishop of Canterbury, 
Hoare confessed how much he had been ‘aided by my conservative past and by the fact that I had attempted to 
make a reconciliation with Italy in 1935’ when making friends amongst ‘the more conservative elements’ in 
Spain (30 December 1940); XIII:2(57). 
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asked the Rector of the English College in Valladolid, Monsignor Henson, to assist Hoare ‘in 
the work which has been entrusted to him.’4  
Aware of the weight of the Church in Spanish life and politics, Hoare did not miss the 
opportunity to establish contact with the Spanish ecclesiastical hierarchy. From the moment 
of his arrival, the ambassador met numerous religious leaders and noticed the Spanish clergy’s 
disappointment with the spiritual state of the country. In Hoare’s words, they were expecting 
‘a Catholic renaissance after the Civil War but the renaissance has not showed itself.’5 They 
blamed the pro-Axis Falange party for this, and Hoare must have been very happy to hear 
Cardinal Isidro Gomá’s description of the European war as ‘a war between Christianity and 
paganism.’6 It occurred that the Spanish Church and Hoare had a common enemy, and the 
ambassador soon found the way to exploit this situation further, with the full support of Lord 
Halifax, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: ‘we are on the right lines with Spain … 
the power of religion in the country is a real force, more permanent than the antics of the 
Falange!’7 
This incipient religious propaganda centred on Hoare’s personal contacts would eventually 
turn, towards the spring of 1942, into a special department on its own: the Embassy’s religious 
propaganda (ERP). Dependent on Burn’s EPO, this special section aimed to respond to the 
Nazi propaganda rhetoric on the ‘Red Peril’ and the ‘crusade against Bolshevism’ that 
followed Hitler’s invasion of the USSR in the summer of 1941. This propaganda insisted that 
an Allied victory would be a victory of the Russians, and that this would allow the Spanish 
‘Reds’ to provoke another civil war in Spain. As Hoare put it, British propaganda had to 
counteract the ‘ever-haunting fear that a British victory may lead to the restoration of a “Red” 
régime in Spain’, since there are some ‘whose fear of Communism and whose memories of 
                                                
4 William Godfrey to Monsignor Henson (27 May 1940); XIII:1.b(12). 
5 To Cosmo G. Lang (30 December 1940); XIII.2(57). 
6 To Cosmo G. Lang (6 June 1940); XIII.2(4).  
7 Lord Halifax to Hoare (21 December 1940); XIIII:20(82). 
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Communist atrocities still kindle hostility to any democratic affiliations.’ The British 
Embassy’s propaganda campaign enlisted the Spanish clergy because they had a ‘deep 
resentment against Falangism, and a growing discontent with the Government that has used it 
as its chief instrument.’8 The mission of the ERP was, in Burns’ own words, ‘forcing it home 
to the people that Nazism was the immediate and most real enemy of their sacred heritage.’9 
 
2.  The Functioning of the Religious Propaganda: 
the case of ‘Father L.A. ’  
From June 1942, the ERP started to fully operate under the supervision of Bernard Malley, 
who remained in charge of it until the end of the war.10 As described by the ambassador, 
Malley was ‘outstanding amongst the non-diplomatic staff, very discreet and tactful, invaluable 
with his contacts and worth the whole of the rest of the Press Department put together.’11 
Malley explained the ERP’s raison d’être in the following terms:  
‘the [Spanish] people’s traditional religious fervour and faith in their pastors have given 
us an opportunity to attack, without causing any offence to political sensibility, the 
weakest point in our enemy’s armour. The Spanish Church … [w]ith its hierarchical 
system and its far reaching institutions, it has still a great influence upon Spanish 
minds.’12 
In other words, the aim of the ERP was ‘to use members of the Church for the purpose of 
carrying out a great drive of anti-Nazism.’ This, however, was not solely the product the 
Embassy’s machination as it was built upon a previous ‘anti-Nazi redoubt in the Spanish 
Church’, although Malley justly claimed a share in the creation of it: 
‘We have been the medium whereby many church people have become acquainted with 
what was going on in Europe. We have been able to convey to them just that 
                                                
8 To Anthony Eden, ‘A Year and a half of Spanish Non-Belligerency’ (5 January 1942); 22(2), p. 5. 
9 Burns, ‘British Propaganda in Spain in 1943’ (22 August 1944); XIII:23(41)[c]viii, p. 2. 
10 To Brendan Bracken (24 June 1942); XIII:19(36). In relation to Malley’s visit to London see the answer from 
Bracken (20 July 1942); XIII:19(42).  
11 To Alexander Cadogan (7 March 1941); XIII:18(9). 
12 [Malley,] untitled document (undated, [1942: ‘[f]rom the very beginning of the war … [t]hree years have 
passed’]); XIII:7(60), p. 1. 
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knowledge which the enemy is determined to suppress … to provide them with direct 
news of Catholic communities suffering from the hardships and cruelties of German 
invasion.’13 
The so-called process of ‘enlightenment’ of the Spanish people was divided in two phases. 
The first part of the job was to recruit priests wanting to collaborate. Upon agreement with 
the Embassy’s contact, these members of the Spanish clergy helped distributing pamphlets 
and other written material amongst their fellows. This material was usually authored by the 
Pope, pro-Ally clerics, and German bishops who opposed Nazism, as well as a selection of 
Nazi leaders’ writings ‘containing sacrilegious attacks on the Christian belief and against the 
Catholic Church.’ Between October 1942 and November 1943, for instance, some 200,000 
books and pamphlets were distributed in this way. The second part of the work was a ‘vital 
aspect of “enlightenment” of the Spanish people through the medium of the Spanish Church.’ 
This consisted in the diffusion, by the priests themselves, of pro-Ally propaganda amongst 
ordinary Spaniards through sermons, lectures, conferences, retreats and other daily parochial 
and pastoral duties of the clergy.14 
At all time there were four priests ‘travelling up and down the country’ with the aim of setting 
up centres of distribution, making new contacts, gathering information about conditions in 
different dioceses and doing all they could to enlarge the network with trustworthy anti-Nazi 
elements of the Church. The main advantage of such means of propaganda is that priests 
enjoyed a certain degree of immunity from the police and the Falange. In the strange case, 
however, that one of these ‘priest-agents’ was arrested as it happened to one of them in the 
Aragón province, substitutes were ready ‘should the occasion for their services arise.’15 In fact, 
Malley boasted he had ‘a group of priests who are quite undaunted and for whom even a 
                                                
13 Ibid., p. 4. 
14 Ibid., p. 5. 
15 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
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Spanish gaol has no terrors …  Romans to the backbone who will never submit to any 
Spanish government on matters of conscience.’16 
‘Father L.A.’, one of Malley’s four emissaries, explained how the two phases described above 
worked in practice after returning from a two-month period in the archdiocese of Zaragoza.17 
Firstly, he met the leaders of the three most important Religious Orders in the provinces of 
Zaragoza, Huesca and Teruel, this is, the Franciscan Capuchins, the Carmelites, and the 
Escolapios (Schola Pia). Convinced by Father L.A.’s speech, these clergymen agreed ‘with great 
enthusiasm to help Fr. L.A., to authorise him to address all the religious communities under 
their obedience and to provide them with copies of anti-Nazi pastorals by Spanish bishops, of 
the pastorals of the German and Dutch hierarchies.’ The choice for these three Orders was 
due to the fact that their extensive circle of friends among the laity was ‘incalculable’, and that 
their pastoral activities were ‘eminently suited’ to the Embassy’s propaganda purposes. The 
three Orders were devoted to preaching and to the confessional, and, most importantly, they 
also operated numerous schools that catered for ‘the education of the middle classes.’ Father 
L.A. also used the ecclesiastical organisation itself as a ‘method of penetration’, since in every 
arciprestazgo there were to be found ‘sympathisers with our cause’. After locating them, these 
volunteers received instructions on the propagation of ‘the cause of the truth’, as described by 
the priests themselves.  
The second phase of the ‘enlightenment’ operation targeted the general public, and was indeed 
the most important part of the ERP: 
‘The confessor being thoroughly convinced that all that Christians hold dear is in danger 
believes it his duty to bring to the notice of his penitents the utterances of the Pope and 
the bishops and to open their eyes to the fact that the Church faces a far more powerful 
enemy than she has ever faced before.’ 
                                                
16 Malley, ‘Memorandum’ (23 June 1942); XIII:19(36)[b], p. 1-2.  
17 The experiences of ‘Father L.A.’ are based on Malley’s memorandum from 23 June 1942, cited above. 
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By summer 1944, the ‘all-the-year round canvassing of the clergy by selected priests’ had 
gained the British Embassy a considerable network of 27 ‘distribution centres’, each of them 
having a secondary group of distributors from which the propaganda could be delivered.18 
The Seville centre, for instance, which was administered by the Canon of the Cathedral, soon 
became ‘a most important one’. In March 1944 report from the superintending priest, who 
visited personally each of the 27 centres throughout the year, stated about this centre: ‘I may 
say with satisfaction that in the archiepiscopal Curia the great majority of its members are, like 
the Cardinal, avowedly and enthusiastically pro-Ally in their sentiments.’ The region of Galicia, 
which had distribution centres in each of its five cathedral cities, was also another pro-Ally 
stronghold, as the superintendent once described:  
‘At Santiago de Compostela the Cathedral Chapter is anglophile in its majority. Its 
members have spontaneously asked for our books and pamphlets. The Archbishop was 
the first to express his delight at being able to receive a regular supply of the literature 
he had desired … the Jesuit and Franciscan communities are enthusiastic helpers. Every 
useful element is now recruited in Santiago and district.’19 
 
3.  Hoare and the British Ecclesiastics’  Declaration  
In parallel to the ERP’s systematic propaganda operations, Hoare continued to enlist the help 
of British ecclesiastics to gain the Spanish clergy’s support for the Ally cause. During May 
1942 alone, the ambassador visited the bishops and archbishops of Valladolid, Burgos, León, 
Coruña, Santiago de Compostela, Vigo, Lugo and Pontevedra, were he found that the feeling 
against Nazism was ‘growing formidably every day.’ When he visited the Archbishop of 
Valladolid, who was ‘the leading personality amongst them’20, the ambassador gave him a 
personal letter alongside a copy of a very singular piece of propaganda. Although Hoare 
                                                
18 These were Andújar, Asturias, Badajoz, Cáceres, Cádiz, Córdoba, Coruña, Gijón, Guadix, Granada, Jaén, León, 
Lugo, Málaga, Mondoñedo, Orense, Oviedo, Seville, Santander, Salamanca, Santiago, Toledo, Tuy, Valencia, 
Vigo, Vitoria, and Zaragoza. In Madrid, Bilbao and Barcelona, this task was carried out by the British Embassy 
and the British Consulates respectively. 
19 OPC, ‘Planning Report. Part B. Channels’ (30 July 1944); XIII:7(21), pp. [10-11]. 
20 To William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury (29 May 1942); XIII:4(25). 
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initially intended to give copies to each of the bishops he visited that month, he came to the 
conclusion that it was better to give it only to the Archbishop of Valladolid —‘If I had given it 
to all of them, it would have had the appearance of a distribution of propaganda.’21 
The mysterious document was a declaration signed by the five highest religious authorities in 
Britain: the archbishops of Canterbury, Westminster, and York, together with the President of 
the Free Church Council, and the leader of the Scottish Church. This peculiar ‘manifesto’ 
quoted two excerpts that were not accidentally put together. The first was a quotation of Pope 
Pius XII’s 1941 Christmas Eve allocution in which he urged for the ‘collaboration of all 
Christendom in the religious & moral aspects of the new edifice which is to be constructed.’ 
Alongside the Pope’s words, the document also cited President Roosevelt’s ‘Four Freedoms’ 
as spoken to the United States Congress on 6 January 1941, making it explicit that the Allies 
conformed to the principles of the Catholic Church.22 
As discussed above, Hoare gave this document to the Archbishop of Valladolid together with 
a personal letter. In this letter, the ambassador cited once again the words of Pope Pius XII, 
emphasising that ‘[i]n England, more than in any other country, Christians of different 
denominations are showing their deep concern for the salvation of the moral and social order 
upon which Western civilization is based.’ The document signed by the leaders of the British 
Churches not in communion with Rome, constituted then the ultimate proof that they 
‘wholeheartedly accepted the Pope’s five fundamental essentials of a Christian order and they 
have proclaimed them from their pulpits.’ Hoare also quoted the words of some of the 
Catholic anti-Nazi leaders such as a line by Cardinal Michael von Faulhaber, Archbishop of 
Munich, in which he urged for the union of Protestants and Catholics as the only way of 
opposing Nazism: ‘[t]he two great christian bodies know that for both the issue today is one 
                                                
21 See letters to Anthony Eden (26 May 1942), and to Harold Buxton, Lord Bishop of Gibraltar (29 May 1942); 
XIII:22(20) and XIII:4(26) respectively. 
22 [Malley], untitled document (‘April 1942’); XIII:4(18). 
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of life or death … In rejecting Christianity no distinction can be made between the different 
christian denominations.’23 
 
4. The Ambassador’s ‘donations’ to the Spanish Church 
Material gifts were also a very powerful way of ‘convincing’. Once these material donations 
adopted the form of 10,000 pesetas that the ambassador sent to the Archbishop of Seville 
‘para fomento del culto en dicho Templo Metropolitano.’24 However, a much more peculiar 
donation occurred following a letter from the 4th Duke of Wellington some months after 
Hoare’s arrival to Spain. The letter explained the peripatetic story of a list of Church plate that 
was sent back to England by the 1st Duke of Wellington during the Peninsular War (1808-
1814) ‘for safe keeping and forgotten about.’ The 4th Duke of Wellington returned them to 
Spain just before the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936. Fearing that these antiquities would 
be looted, the British agent Mr. Mostyn tried to return them to England via Gibraltar but he 
could only get to Algeciras, where he put them at the Banco Español de Crédito and they were 
kept throughout the civil conflict. The duke’s original idea, as expressed in the letter, was to 
‘give the plate to those places where the Spanish and their English allies beat the French’ in 
order to strengthening the bonds with Britain and thus ‘help to prevent Spain coming into the 
present war.’25 Hoare discussed the duke’s suggestion with the Spanish authorities and finally 
arrived to the conclusion that it was better to keep all the Church plate together as a single 
offering, which he gave —not surprisingly— to the Archbishop of Valladolid.26  
                                                
23 See the Spanish original letter to the Archbishop of Valladolid (15 May 1942); XIII:4(23). The English version 
of this letter can be found in XIII:4(19)[duplicated]. 
24 ‘To foment the cult in that Metropolitan temple’; From Pedro Segura y Sáez, Archbishop of Seville (14 
January 1944); XIII:6(3). 
25 Letter from the Duke of Wellington to the Duke of Alba, Spanish Ambassador in London, together with an 
inventory of the Church plate (14 August 1940); XIII:2(23). Regarding the church plate see also XIII:2(31), 
2(38), 2(40), 2(43), 2(45), 2(46) and 20(78). 
26 To Cosmo G. Lang, Archbishop of Canterbury (30 December 1940); XIII.2(57). 
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On another occasion, Hoare paid visited the Benedictine Monastery at Montserrat, ‘one of the 
greatest centres in Spain of religious life and study’, where he discovered with surprise that the 
monks were ‘solidly with us’. With such support from within the anglophile monastery, which 
was constantly visited by ‘[t]housands of pilgrims’, Hoare saw the opportunity to establish 
there a ‘first-class centre of propaganda’, as he wrote to the MOI.27 In fact, it was the monks 
themselves who asked the ambassador to have an ‘Encyclopedia Británica’ sent to their library, a 
relatively insignificant donation considering the great impetus that this association meant for 
British interests in Spain.28 
 
5. The Embassy’s Religious Propaganda:  
‘Una misión altísima’ 
In a letter to the MOI, Hoare mentioned that the main reason for the ERP’s great success was 
the fact that ‘we are almost everywhere making Spaniards do it for us, and do it on Spanish 
lines … it is the case of Spaniards themselves making the propaganda that we desire, but 
making it as a part of Spanish life.’29 The following extract shows how satisfied was the 
ambassador and how effective this peculiar type of propaganda had been to tilt Spanish 
opinion away from the Germans:  
‘As you know, I have myself taken the closest possible interest in our Spanish 
propaganda. This entitles me, after a two years’ struggle with incessant difficulties, to be 
pretty sure about certain of my conclusions. Perhaps the most outstanding conclusion 
that I have reached is that our greatest success has resulted from the subtle propaganda 
that, thanks to Burns and Malley, we have continuously carried on in Church circles. 
This steady drip of religious propaganda has been as much responsible for the changed 
atmosphere in Spain as any other single factor … the most effective in the present 
atmosphere of Spain.’30 
                                                
27 To Brendan Bracken (4 June 1942); XIII:19(31).  
28 See letter to Antonio M. Marcet, Abbot of the Monastery of Montserrat (30 April 1942); XIII:4(19), and his 
response to Hoare (25 May 1942); XIII:19(28). Regarding the ‘Encyclopedia Británica’ negotiations with London 
see also two letters from Brendan Bracken (16 and 30 June 1942); XIII:19(34), and XIII:19(38) respectively. 
29 To Brendan Bracken (4 June 1942); XIII:19(31).  
30 To Brendan Bracken (24 June 1942); XIII:19(36). In relation to Malley’s visit to London see the answer from 
Bracken (20 July 1942); XIII:19(42).  
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In many occasions, Hoare and his team received compliments from the actual Church leaders 
they were trying to recruit as a vehicle for their propaganda. Cardinal Segura, Archbishop of 
Seville, once quoted an anecdote from an interview with the Generalísimo in which General 
Franco openly condemned Hoare: ‘I have noticed that the British Ambassador has been 
calling upon you. I think that you ought to know that I regard the British Ambassador as a 
very dangerous man.’ The Cardinal’s fearless reaction was to reaffirm that he ‘greatly 
appreciated’ his friendship with Hoare and that Spain actually ‘owed a debt of gratitude’ to 
what he had done.’31 
Similarly, the Archbishop of Valladolid, one of the ecclesiastics to whom Hoare dedicated 
most of his time, defined Hoare’s work in Spain as ‘una misión altísima en la esfera religiosa 
de Inglaterra y consiguientemente del mundo.’32 In fact, the archbishop’s letters were so full of 
enthusiasm that it is difficult to discern who was putting more effort into trying to be in good 
terms with the other. The last example of the ERP’s success belongs to a letter exchange 
between Hoare and the Archbishop of Madrid-Alcalá in which the ecclesiastic praised the 
ambassador’s recent speech of 6 July 1944, ‘que tan favorable eco ha tenido en España’, and 
commented in a comradely tone: ‘siento que la discreción obligue a dejar sólo entre lineas 
otras cosas que debemos los españoles agradecer a V.E.’33 
 
                                                
31 To Anthony Eden (5 August 1943); XIII:23(28). 
32 ‘A highest mission in England’s religious sphere and consequently in the world’; from Antonio García y 
García, Archbishop of Valladolid (2 July 1943); XIII:5(35). 
33 ‘I regret that, for a matter of discretion, I am obliged to leave “between lines” the reasons by which the 
Spanish people should thank Your Excellency’; Manuscript letter from Leopoldo Eijo y Garay, Archbishop of 
Madrid-Alcalá (8 August 1944); XIII:8(40).  
  43 
CHAPTER IV: 
THE EMBASSY MEDICAL SERVICE: AN ‘ALTRUISTIC 
INITIATIVE’? 
 
‘In a separate room Burns’s assistant Bernard Malley ran an additional enterprise 
assisted by qualified medical staff as part of the UK’s hearts and minds campaign: an 
unofficial emergency health service free at the point of delivery. For, stored in a 
refrigerated back room of His Majesty’s Government’s press section, was a stock of 
imported medicines which were financed by another secret British government slush 
fund and smuggled in through the diplomatic bag.’1 
 
1 .  The origins of the Embassy Medical Service 
On 19 August 1941, Hoare wrote to the FO describing the precarious Spanish health 
conditions, which had been aggravated during the summer with a very severe typhus 
epidemic. This epidemic had seriously affected the ‘towns in Spain south of a line drawn 
from Badajoz across the country’, and counted 4,000 victims in the city of Málaga alone. 
The ambassador advised helping alleviating this situation since the Spaniards had ‘little or 
no organisation to deal with an epidemic of this kind.’ Hence, as soon as the Spanish 
health authorities pleaded the American Rockefeller Institute to supply Spain with large 
quantities of vaccine, Hoare suggested providing the necessary navicerts to bring the 
medicines to Spain ‘without delay.’2 
This experience provided with the basis for what it would eventually become the 
Embassy Medical Service (EMS). As Hoare reported to Anthony Eden in March 1942, the 
triggering idea came from Captain Hillgarth, the Naval Attaché, whose numerous Spanish 
contacts showed him the urgent need for some crucial drugs. Hoare and the Embassy staff 
then realised that ‘a carefully controlled distribution of these necessities would be an 
                                                
1 Jimmy Burns, Papa Spy: Love, Faith and Betrayal in Wartime Spain (London, 2009), p. 212. 
2 To Anthony Eden (19 August 1941); XIII:21(50). 
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excellent method of propaganda.’ Over the autumn, a small clinic was set up in the 
Embassy’s Press Department under the ‘very personal and efficient control’ of Bernard 
Malley. From the opening of the service, Hoare emphasised the need to avoid ‘any general 
publicity or any appearance of a routine distribution’ which gave this service the 
appearance of mere propaganda. Individuals who needed the drugs had to bring the 
doctor’s prescription to the Embassy and request them personally. The service was free of 
charge provided that they wrote a personal letter of thanks to the ambassador after having 
received the drugs. Obviously, this service was not entirely based on altruistic ideals, even 
though it did well to many people. Only a few months after the Medical Service started to 
function, Hoare wrote to the FO saying that he had the ‘convinced opinion that this 
propaganda, in so far as it has gone, and it has gone deep, has been the most effective of 
any that we have made in Spain, mainly because of its personal character and its absence 
of routine.’3 
 
2.  Malley’s Memorandum:  
The Functioning of the Embassy Medical Service 
Hoare’s letter to the FO was accompanied by a memorandum4 reporting on this ‘most 
interesting report upon the side of our propaganda known as the Embassy Medical 
Service.’ This memorandum, elaborated by Malley, is the first official document to report 
on the functioning of this propaganda strategy, and it is accompanied by two appendices: a 
list of the institutions ‘not associated with Falange’ that were receiving support from this 
service, and an inventory of the drugs and clinical materials that have been used and that 
need to be replenished.  
                                                
3 To Anthony Eden (19 March 1942); XIII:22(10). 
4 Malley, ‘Memorandum’, accompanied by ‘Appendix A: List of institutions —not associated with Falange— 
which have received assistance from the Embassy Medical Service’; and ‘Appendix B: List of drugs and 
materials with quantities & observations’ (16 March 1942); XIII:22(10)[b], [c], and [d] respectively. 
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Malley starts by explaining how the tragic health conditions and need for food 
supplies and basic drugs, made the Embassy initiate ‘a work which the so-called friends of 
Spain —Germany and Italy— have never attempted.’ The material means to support this 
initiative were provided with the arrival of a large consignment of medicines, drugs and 
other surgical material that reached the Embassy in June 1941. In words of Malley, these 
materials provided  
‘a unique opportunity of performing a great work of mercy, of extending British 
influence and prestige in the capital and in the provinces and therefore in 
counteracting in a very decisive manner the increasing German efforts to created a 
spirit of hatred and distrust of Britain and her Mission in Spain.’ 
The Embassy staff had learnt from the experience of the American Embassy, which had 
already distributed large quantities of milk and flour with the aim of alleviating the starved 
population, although with little success. Most of these goods found their way either into 
the black market or into the hands of the Falange relief institutions, ‘where dishonesty and 
corruption have ruined what was once a high ideal.’ In order to avoid repeating the story, 
the staff of the British Embassy decided to dispense the drugs only to people with medical 
prescription, and to make no publicity of this service. The absence of publicity was actually 
an advantage since, according to the report, ‘the idea of propaganda conveys to Spanish 
minds a sense of suspicion and mistrust.’ Every day, up to eighty patients were given 
medicines, supplied with first aid and injections, and attended by a doctor either at the 
EMS’s premises or at their own homes.5 As a consequence, the EMS acquired ‘features of 
generosity and disinterest’ that obviously found great sympathy amongst the peoples being 
aided and who were not used to ‘disinterested’ philanthropy: 
‘The majority of the patients were naturally unknown to us. They thought it 
incredible that they should not be asked for identity papers or questioned about 
their social standing or political antecedents. They expressed still greater surprise 
when told there was nothing to pay … The letters of gratitude from humble people 
                                                
5 OPC, ‘Plan of Propaganda for Spain. Second Revision of Channels’ (20 October 1943); XIII:6(2v), p. 8. 
  46 
are perhaps the most striking in their sincerity. The old Spanish phrase: “May God 
keep you many years” is no formality there; it is a heartfelt wish.’ 
However, it was not only humble people that were assisted. As Malley put it, in order ‘to 
obtain the best possible results, careful study has been made of the ways and means of 
multiplying our influence among all classes of the people.’ This was not a difficult 
objective given the acute lack of medicines in wartime Spain, which affected Spaniards 
from all socio-economic backgrounds, including peoples from the bourgeoisie, the liberal 
professions and the Spanish aristocracy. These people usually were as thankful as they 
were ashamed for the gratuitous help, and when the Marquesa de Albayda, for instance, 
sent some money in return for the medicines she needed for one of her sons, Hoare 
answered saying that, 
‘el suministro de medicinas es una aportación personal del Embajador para ayudar a 
remediar las necesidades del pueblo español y por lo tanto es gratuito. Si Vd. me lo 
permite tendré mucho gusto en dedicar dicho importe a los pobres de este distrito 
de Buenavista.’6 
Only in 1942, up to 4,000 letters of acknowledgement and gratitude were received, and 
this figure raised well over 8,000 during 1943.7 In addition to reaching Spaniards from all 
social groups, the EMS also reached children’s orphanages, religious charities and hospitals 
in regions ranging from Galicia to Seville.8 
The generous consignments full of medicaments and other clinical supplies 
continued to arrive in Madrid with the diplomatic bag throughout 1942. As described in 
the January 1943 memorandum —that accounts for the March 1942-January 1943 
period— the Embassy’s staff had to work harder to combat the effects of the Malaria 
                                                
6 ‘[T]he Ambassador personally provides the drugs in order to help alleviate the needs of the Spanish people 
and therefore the service is free of charge. If I am allowed, I will be delighted to devote this sum of money 
to Buenavista disctrict’s poorest people’; Manuscript letter by Marquesa de Albayda (undated); XIII:5(27); 
Hoare’s answer (14 May 1943); XIII:5(18). 
7 Burns, ‘British Propaganda in Spain in 1943’ (22 August 1944); XIII:23(41)[c](vii), p. 2. 
8 Malley, ‘Memorandum’ (16 March 1942); XIII:22(10)[b], p. 1-4. For a detail account on the drugs and 
materials administered, the geographical distribution of the Medical Service and the institutions supplied 
until March 1942, see the two appendices cited in note No. 4 of this chapter. 
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epidemic that spread across Spain during the summer of 1942. In the aforementioned 
report, Malley described how the British Embassy personnel was overwhelmed by the 
scope of the catastrophe since the EMS was virtually the sole relief organisation:  
‘We are still alone in the field of medical assistance to the Spanish people in distress 
… The German Embassy possesses a medicine store; but its contents are reserved 
for the use of the German officials … The U.S.A. Embassy has not yet made a new 
move in the matter of medical supplies.’ 
In parallel to the relief work, Hoare created the ‘H.M. Ambassador’s Charity Fund’ for 
which the ambassador set aside a sum of 25,000 pesetas with the double aim of purchasing 
medicines that could be obtained in Madrid but were ‘beyond the means of the sick poor’. 
More than 350 patients were given medicines thanks to this fund during the first half of 
1944 alone.9 The same fund also served as a financial gratification to those Spaniards who 
had been  ‘persecuted or imprisoned on account of their pro-British activities.’10  
Although the services continued until the end of the war, the last document that 
accounts for the EMS’s activities dates from January 1944. The key feature of its period 
under review —January 1943 to January 1944— was the ‘successful campaign against the 
dyptheria [sic] epidemic’ that was successfully overcome with only one person death. This 
was due to the fact that the Embassy’s Press Office had publicly announced ‘the miracles’ 
of the recently discovered Penicillin, putting the EMS under great strain since demands for 
Penicillin came from all parts of the country. In order to solve the logistic challenge of 
reaching far away parts of Spain, the EMS enlisted the help of the religious propaganda 
department ‘which has means of reaching all parts of Spain.’  
The 1944 report also comments on other miscellanea charitable activities carried out 
by the EMS. On 6 January 1944, for example, the EMS celebrated ‘the feast of the Spanish 
Santa Claus’ (i.e. ‘Los Tres Reyes Magos’), in which 150 sick and poor children received toys 
                                                
9 OPC, ‘Plan of Propaganda for Spain. Second Revision of Channels’ (20 October 1943); XIII:6(2v)VI, p. 8. 
10 Malley, ‘Memorandum’, and ‘Inventory and Observations’ (25 January 1943); XIII:5(5)[a] and [b]. 
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and were entertained with a film show and a tea party at the Embassy’s premises. The 
Ambassadress, Lady Maud Hoare, was in charge of distributing the toys and also made a 
gift of 300 suits of clothes to working men with large families: ‘their wholeheartedly 
expression of gratitude went far beyond the precincts of the Embassy.’11 
 
 
 
 
                                                
11 [Malley,] ‘Medical Supplies’ (23 June 1944); XIII:6(61). 
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CONCLUSION 
The foremost evident of this study’s contribution is the certainty that the British did 
develop a fully operational propaganda scheme in Spain, centred on the Madrid embassy 
and led by Sir Samuel Hoare. Such assertion would be redundant if it was not because, as 
discussed in the introduction, historical scholarship has mostly disregarded such a rich 
aspect of Second World War history as it is propaganda, and particularly the propaganda 
used by the Allies. This might be due to the negative connotations associated with the 
word ‘propaganda’, or to the historians’ unawareness of the value these methods were 
given within the Allies’ wartime effort. For the present study, and in view of the 
evidences, the main conclusions are: 
1. British propaganda in Spain originated from ambassador Hoare’s personal initiatives 
whose main objective was to fulfil the ‘special mission’ he had been assigned with in May 
1940.  
2. Despite its humble origins, and driven by instinct, these initial and unorganised 
propaganda measures eventually gave way to a competent organisation with headquarters 
at the Embassy’s Press Office, and an important network of contacts that made sure that 
British propaganda material reached all of Spain’s corners, and social classes. 
3. A greater part of the Embassy’s propaganda successes were due to Hoare’s and his 
staff’s capacity to adjust British interests to Spanish traditions, norms and needs, as well 
as to their constant struggle against the press and the ministries in order to define and 
maintain a coherent and unilateral approach to Franco’s Spain.   
4. The propagandists openly combatted any British spontaneous attempt of ‘grey’ or 
‘black’ propaganda against Spain in order to maintain the credibility of their ‘white’ 
propaganda, since their utmost objective was to develop an Anglo-Spanish friendship 
based on trust and stable relations. 
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5. They did use less orthodox methods of propaganda such as the religious and medical 
service propaganda; however, whereas the subversive religious propaganda filled the 
demands of an increasingly anti-Falange and anti-Nazi clergy, the Embassy’s Medical 
Service resulted in a very significant relief work from which Spaniards greatly benefited.  
6. Lastly, British propaganda was clearly a reaction to Nazi Germany’s propaganda and 
great influence within Spain, although there were significant differences between the two 
of them. Overall, British propaganda proved more effective amongst Spaniards probably 
due to the fact that it was less intrusive than the means of the Germans and posed no 
threat to national security. As Burns summarised it: ‘If the only German news was 
propaganda, the only Allied propaganda was, very rightly, news.’1  
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 OPC: ‘Planning Report. Part A. Appreciation’ (30 July 1944); XIII:7(21), p. 3. 
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